Testamentary Promises to Pay by Abbott, Nathan
University of Michigan Law School
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles Faculty Scholarship
1892
Testamentary Promises to Pay
Nathan Abbott
University of Michigan Law School
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/1145
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Abbott,Nathan. "Testamentary Promises to Pay." Mich. L. J. 1 (1892): 154-61.
MICHIGAIN LAW JOURNAL.
TESTAMENTARY PROMISES TO PAY.
PROFESSOR NATHAN ABBOTT.
The New York Law Journal for May 23, 1892, contains a suggestive
editorial headed "A Will or Not a Will," in which the writer says "Inter-
esting questions are constantly arising in the classification of instruments
which, although expressing wishes or intentions to be carried out after
death, are open to criticism on the score of testamentary execution." As
is intimated by the writer, the difficulty of placing an instrument in either
the class of contracts or wills is considerably diminished if the statutory
provisions as to execution of wills are elaborate. *Where holographic wills
are allowed, or wills of personal property require no witnesses or no sig-
nature of the testator, the question of whether a promise to pay may be a
good testament or a valid obligation is not uncommon. In this connection
it is well enough to remark that a writing good as a testament at the time
when passed upon might not be good to-day in the same court, by reason
of change in the formalities required in executing a testament, and for
this reason the dates are given when cases referred to in this article were
decided. The ecclesiastical law, which required no particular form in the
writing or executing of a will of personalty, nor even a signature where
prevented by act of God, is true in this country save where modified by
statute. 1 Wcerner on Adm., § 38; 1 Redfield Wills, Ch. VI, Sec. 1
§§ 1-11; Masterman v. Maberly, 2 Hag. Eccl. 235, 247 (1829). But while
the possibility of uncertainty has been reduced materially, at least three
interesting cases have arisen lately involving the question of whether cer-
tain writings were testamentary or not. These are referred to in the
above editorial, and of them the two first are Re Richardson's Estate (29
Pac. Repr., 484), where the instrument was a letter and the question was
whether it might be probated as a holographic will, and Robinson v.
Brewster (30 N. E. Repr., 683) where the same question arose as to a
deed. In the latter case, as the writing is brief, it is given in full:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that I, Joseph Robinson, for the
consideration of one dollar, to me in hand paid, as well as my affection, do
hereby assign and set over to my daughter, Eliza Jane Brewster, all of my
property, both personal and real, to have the same after my death.
Witness my hand and seal this 7th day of May, 1877.His
Attest: J. S. POST, JOSEPH X ROBINSON. [SEAL]
E. MCCLELLAN. Mark
This was admitted to probate as a will. The last case of the three
cases referred to is in the nature of a promise to pay, or a promissory note,
to take effect after death of the maker, and a discussion of this class of
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cases will be the object of this article. The case is Hegeman v. lloon,
decided by the New York Court of Appeals in March, 1892 (30 N. E.
Repr., 487), and the court had before it a paper in this form:
$1,976.90. BROOKLYN, February 8, 1871.
One year after my death I hereby direct my executors to pay to
Joseph Hegeman, his heirs, executors, or assigns, the sum of nineteen
hundred and seventy-six dollars and ninety cents, being the balance due
him for cash advanced at various times by him to Adrian Hegeman, my
son, and others, as per statement rendered by him this day, without
interest. CORNELIA W. HEGEMAN.
This, though testamentary in form, was held to be a promissory note
in effect.
That an instrument in form is a note, check or indorsement will not
prevent its operating as a testament is liustrated by several cases. In
Chaworth v. Beech 4, Yes. Jr., 555 (1799), the deceased had indorsed on a
bank note:
1791, June 13th. I give this note unto Sarah Hawksley, which is
along with me for the love and regard I have for her.
GEORGE CHAWORTH.
Witness: JOHN BURTON.
The note so indorsed having been delivered to Sarah Hawksley by
Chaworth, after his death she brought suit as indorsee and the writing was
declared testamentary. In another suit against Chaworth's executor for
an accounting it was said that the writing might have been proved as a
will. In Bartholomew v. Henley, 3 Phillim. 317 (1820), deceased had
drawn several checks payable to the order of a young woman with whom
he was living, and in whose favor he bad made his will. On the stubs of
the checks were entries substantially alike. One such entry was as
follows:
2808. Jan. 16, 1817.
I give this check to Miss Eyre for fear anything should happen to me
before I can make a codicil to my will. X250.
It was held that the checks and indorsement on the stubs together
were testamentary and could be probated as codicils to the will.
In Hunt v. H~unt, 4 N. H., 434 (1828), is an illustration of an indorse-
ment of a note that was admitted to probate. The note and indorsement
were as follows:
$1,000. BRATTLEBORO, April 28, 1813.
For value received I promise to pay Arad Hunt or his order, one
thousand dollars, within one year from this date, and interest.
LUTHER WELD.
Atttest: JONATHAN HUNT.
If I am not living at the time this note is paid, I order the contents
to be paid to Arad Hunt, 2d. Witness, ARAD HUNT.
Somewhat resembling the last case is Schad's Appeal, 88 Pa., 111
(1878), in which the writing construed was as follows:
MIOHIGtA_ A W .TOUBR2AL.
PITTSBURGH, December 11, 1875.
I, Conrad Schad, husband of Margaretta Schad, have insured my life
with the Knickerbocker Company, in New York, for four thousand dollars
($4,000). I, Conrad Schad, assign the whole amount, $4,000, to my wife,
Margaretta Schad, after my death, when she can do with it according to
her best will, without partiality toward her children. This I have written
with good sound mind and set my name to it. CONRAD SOHAD.
This was held testamentary. It is to be noted in this case that the
assignor retained the policy in his possession. Three years later, in Fios-
selman v. Elder, 98 Pa., 159 (1881), an interesting case came before the
Court on the following facts. The deceased, Elizabeth Fosselman, had left
a will, and among her effects was found a sealea envelope addressed by her:
"Dear Bella, this is for you to open." It was opened by a niece of the
deceased named Isabella, who was a legatee in the will, and was found to
contain a promissory note for $2,000, payable to the order of the deceased,
and the following letter:
LEWISTON, October 2, 1879.
My wish is for you to draw this 2,000 dollars for your own use, should
I die sudden. ELIZABETH FOSSELUAN.
It was held that the "you" of the letter might be shown to mean the
"Bella" of the address, and that "Bella" might be shown to be "Irabella,"
who was the niece named in the will of the deceased, and the note, letter
and address on the envelope were probated as a codicil of Miss Fosselman's
will.*
Contrasted with these cases, and illustrating the principle that such
instruments as the abovQ would not be entitled to probate if not executed
in due form, are the cases of Gough v. Findon, 7 Wels, H. & G. 48 (1851),
and Mitchell v. Smith, 4 De G. J. & S. 422 (1864). In Gou.qh v. Findon,
one Clarke had made two notes of £400 and £200, respectively, in favor of
Sarah Gough, who, at the time, was and for a long time had been his ser'v-
ant. After Clarke's death his executors found two letters directed to
"Sarah Gough, my late servant." One of the letters held the note for £200
and stated, "In addition to anything I may owe you, I enclose you 200 1. as
a mark of my respect." The other letter, enclosing the note for X400 stated
it to be for her "long and faithful services." It was held that these
writings were not entitled to probate as they were not executed in accord-
ance with the Statute of Wills. (I Vict., passed after the date of Barhol.
omew v. Henley). In the case of Mitchell v. Smith, one Joseph Patterson
put three notes in the hands of his nephew, Simon Smith, saying; "I give
you these notes," adding "that Smith should have them after his (Patter-
son's) death but that he (Patterson) would like to be master of them as
long as he lived." Smith said they required indorsing, and Patterson
indorsed them as follows:
* Of. 8F'clev. Snepp, 97 Ind., 289 (1884). In this case notes folded up with and referred to In a
will were made a part of the will.
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24th September, 1857.
I bequeath-pay the within contents to Simon Smith, or his order, at
my death. His
JOSEPH X PATTERSON.
Witness: STEPHEN TEAL. mark.
It was held that this endorsement was testamentary in tenor, bat not
executed in due form so as to be entitled to probate. If it had been wit-
nessed by a sufficient number of witnesses the decision on this point would
have been different.
There are several cases to the same effect in this country. In the case
of Moore v. Stephens, 97 Ind., 271 (1884), Mrs. Manning made the follow-
ing writing:
At my death, my estate shall pay to the treasurer of the Benevolent
Friend Society of the White River Annual Conference and Church of the
United Brethren in Christ, the sum of two hundred dollars, the interest of
which is to be used for the benefit of superannuated and worn-out preachers
of the White River Conference.
Given this third day of May, A. D. 1869. My
ELIZABETI X MANNING.
Witness: L. K. MANNING. mark.
This was said to be testamentary in character, but not duly executed.
Nor was it allowed as a valid claim against her estate, on the ground
referred to in the next case, a point to be commented on in connection with
the question of whether such writings are good as obligations. In Cover
v. Stem, 67 Md., 449 (1887), the deceased had written as follows:
Md. September 4, 1884.
At my death, my estate, or my executors, pay to July Ann Cover 3,000
dollars. DAVID EINEL, of P. [SEAL.]
Witness: COLUMBUS COVER.
Unhappily the law of Maryland, as to attesting testaments, had been
changed in 1887, and for lack of two witnesses this could not be proved as
a testament. Nor was it sufficient as an obligation to pay, for the reason
to be referred to later.
All of the foregoing decisions are helpful on the other side of the
question involved. If the instrument be not valid as a testament is it an
obligation that maybe enforced against the estate of the deceased, whether
as a promissory note, or obligation of some sort?
In order to decide this regard must be had to several things. Apart
from the question of intent which is involved in both questions, it is
necessary at the outset to decide whether the writing was delivered.-
Thus in Gough v. Fendon, supra, the court held that the writings were
invalid as notes, being testamentary in intention, and to be delivered after
the maker's death. And in 1fitchell v. Smith, supra, the reservation by
Patterson that he "would like to be master of (the notes) as long as he
*See Clark, v. Lejourney, 17 Conn. 511 (1846) where deceased had indorsed but not delivered a
note payable to his order. The indorsement by the executrix did not pass title.
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lived" rendered the indorsement ineffectual. On this point the court said,
"In order to render the indorsement and delivery of a promissory note
effectual they must be such as to enable the indorsee himself to endorse
and negotiate the note." The matter of delivery is illustrated further in
cases later to be referred to.
But in addition to making and delivering the instrument the relation
of debtor and creditor must be created and subsist in the lifetime of the
parties to the instrument, though the time of payment may be deferred
iintil after the death of the maker. Cover v. Stem, 67 Md., 449 (1887);
Moore v. Stephens, 97 Md., 271 (1884).
This relation of debtor and creditor should be more than nominal, it
should be founded on sufficient consideration. The matter of considera-
tion, as well as the subject as a whole, is well illustrated in the following
cases: In Hofley v. Adams, 16 Vt., 206 (1844) Adams during his last sick-
ness made a gift to his daughter of a note in form following:
For value received, and for the consideration of love and affection that
I have towards Minerva Holley, I promise and agree that she shall have
and receive out of my estate fourteen hundred dollars, to be paid to the
.said Minerva Holley or her heirs after my disease.
BRISTOL, March 16, 1841. RILEY ADABIS.
Although given during his last sickness it was not given under condi-
tions that made it a valid gift mortis causa. And the mere consideration
of love and affection, in absence of evidence of any other consideration,
did not make the note valid as a claim against the estate. It also was
-declared invalid as a testament.
In 1871, the case of Dean v. Carruth, 108 Mass., 242, was decided on
interesting facts. It appears that a Mr. West was a friend of a Mrs. Dean,
previously M rs. Jane I. Baylies. He occasionally made her gifts: "as for
instance of a coal scuttle and a picture of Faith, the former at Christmas."
She, on the'other hand, entertained him at supper Sunday evenings and
rendered him some slight services. At one time he sent her a sealed
envelope addressed, "Mrs. Jane I. Baylies: I do not wish you to open this
until my decease." s. 0. w.
Mrs. Dean retained this unopened until after the death of West, then
opened it and found within a sheet of paper on which was the following:
TAuNTON, August 15, 1857.
For value received I promise to pay Mrs. Jane I. Baylies, five hun-
dred dollars, on demand. SAMUEL 0. WEST.
Witness, A. E. SWASEY.
DEAIR JANE: Please accept the above from your true friend.
S. 0. W.
In a suit on the note against West's administrator to which suit the
defence was want of consideration, the jury found for the payee. On
appeal the court said, "If the jury were satisfied, upon the whole case,
including the note itself, that it was given in payment for services ren-
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dered however disproportionate in value their verdict was right. Inade-
quacy of consideration without fraud is no defence."
Eight years later the case of TWarren v. Duifee (126 Mass., 338) was
decided by the court that decided Dean v. Carruth, on the following facts:
the plaintiff, Miss Warren and James F. Westgate were engaged to be
married. He was ill with heart disease. During their engagement she
had cared for him in his illness and had bought and mended some articles
of his wearing apparel. After a violent attack of his disease he wrote the
following note:
$15,000. FALL Ii VE, December 11, 1875.
On demand after date I promise to pay to the order of Lydia B.
Warren fifteen thousand dollars, value received, payable after death.
JAmES F. WESTGATE.
This note was sealed up in an envelope, and when he gave it to her he
said, "there was something which would provide for her in case anything
should happen to him, that if they were married, and he wanted it given
up, he should expect her to give it up." To this she assented. She
received and retained the note in her possession until after the death of
Westgate. Miss Warren claimed that her promise of a speedy marriage,
and her services to Westgate were sufficient consideration for the note.
But the court said the case was not like Dean v. Carruth, because the note
was not delivered by Westgate absolutely, but conditionally and as a gift
out of his estate, and because it was without consideration. It also was
said not to be valid as a gift rnorlis causa, and not well executed as a
testament. It is hard to reconcile the decision as to consideration with
Dean v. Carruth. The delivery seems to have been absolute, the giver
retaining the right to recall should he so elect in his life time.
With the cases in Massachusetts may be contrasted those in New
York. In TVorth v. Case, 42 N. Y., 362 (1870) it appears that one T. B.
Worth had been ill and his sister Mary 0. had taken care of him. He
afterwards gave her a sealed envelope on which he had written, "Mary 0.
Worth: this is not to be unsealed while I live, and returned to me any
time I may wish it, T B. Worth," and in which he had placed the follow-
ing note:
ADDISON, January 30, 1864.
I promise to pay my sister Mary C. Worth, on demand, ten thousand
dollars in, consideration of services rendered. T. B. WOITH.
Miss Worth retained the envelope and after her brother's death
opened it and found the note. In a suit on the note, the jury made a
special finding that her services were worth $1,000. It was held by the
court on appeal that the note was delivered and that the consideration was
adequate to support the note. After referring to the facts the court say:
"He (Worth) may well, at the time, have estimated her services and
attentions as worth more to him than 810,000. 'For all that a man hath
will he give for his life.' It is true that in the manner of delivering
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it (the note) to her, he reserved the locus penitenice, in case he should
afterwards consider her services of less value to him; but he lived more
than three years after that, and if his acts during that time are evidence
of his opinion, he continued to believe, to the end of his life, that in giving
the note for the consideration he had not committed a mistake. We have
no primary standard by which we can measure or weigh their value to
him." There was a dissenting opinion holding the note not delivered, nor
intended to be operative, but that it was competent evidence of the value
of the services.
In 1876 the case of -Earl v. Peck, 69 N. Y., 596, was decided on facts
of interest. One Dr. George Peck had taken a fatal dose of aconite.
Before his death Mr. Peck made and delivered to Mary Earl the following
note:
$10,000. For value received, I promise to pay Mary Earl, for services
rendered, ten thousand dollars. GEORGE PECK.
STANFORD, October 11, 1873.
In a suit on the note the payee claimed the note was in payment of
services by her for six years as housekeeper, on an understanding with Dr.
Peck that he would not pay her a definite sum, but "would pay her well."
The court held the consideration to be adequate, saying: "If the intestate
chose to pay for services rendered a much larger sum than they were worth,
he had a right to do so. The note was not a gratuity or gift. There is no
standard whereby courts can find the measure of value in such cases."
Cases of this sort are to be distinguished from Carnwright v. Gray,
127 N. Y., 92 (1891), in which the note was as follows:
QUARRYVILLE, September 2, 1871.
Thirty days after date, I promise to pay to Cornelius Carnwright
fifteen hundred dollars, with interest. SAMUEL P. FRELIGE.
In this case the question was as to the effect on the note of the time
of payment, and the court said: "The fact that it was payable after the
death of the maker does not affect its character (3 Kent's Com., 76.)"
Such a writing might be a good holographic will, (of. Re Richardson's
Estate, 20 Pacific Reporter) but the testamentary intent would need to be
shown and that it was revocable; see Bristol v. Warner, 19 Conn., 7(1848.)
It is obvious that the adequacy of consideration of such notes as in
Warren v. Durfee or in Bartholomew v. Henley can be inquired into by
creditors of the deceased maker's estate. And that undue influence could
be set up by parties in interest. The danger of letting such instruments
stand as notes or testaments is well expressed by the court in ITclley v.
Adams, 16 Yt., 206 (1844), sutpra, when, after declaring the note of the
father given to his daughter void for want of consideration and invalid as
a gift mortis causa, it said: "To hold differently, we think, would estab.
lish a very dangerous doctrine, and one that would overturn our whole
system of testamentary disposition of estates. It might in some cases pu
whole estates at the mercy of a few interested individuals who happen to
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have access to and who have gained the confidence of the dying man, and
the transaction would be disencumbered of all the statutory checks which
the law has thrown around the disposition of property by will-there
being no witnesses required, and there being no tribunal instituted by law
for the purpose of testing its validity after the decease of the donor."
If a party in interest, as an executor of the maker's will or adminis-
trator of his estate, is sued by the payee of a note given under circum-
stances of fraud, he may obtain an injunction to restrain the suit, and on
cause shown may have a decree ordering the note given up to be cancelled.
See Esdaile v. LaNauze, 1 Y. and Col., 394; S. 0. 4 L. J. (N. S.) Ex. Eq.
46. This principle is illustrated in the case of Dent v. Bennett, reported
in 5 L. J. (N. S.) Eq., 58 (1835), and in 8 L. J. (N. S.) Eq., 125 (1839).
In this case Jonathan Dent, being infirm and in his eighty-sixth year,
made the following agreement with his physician, Lucas Bennett:
Whereas the said Lucas Bennett does hereby promise and agree that
he will, at all times when required, diligently and faithfully give his med-
ical and surgical attendance to the aforesaid Jonathan Dent for and
during the remainder of his life; and the said Jonathan Dent, in consider-
ation thereof and out of gratitude and respect to his friend, the said Lucas.
Bennett, for past services and for having saved his life when in the great-
est danger, does hereby promise and agree that the said Lucas Bennett.
shall be fully entitled to the sum £25,000 at the said Jonathan Dent's,
decease.
The agreement also directed that sum of money to be paid by Dent'
executors out of his personal estate, within six months from his decease,
independent of any will the said Dent had then made or might make after
the date of the agreement. Mr. Dent died four years after making the
agreement, and Bennett brought a suit at law against his executors to
enforce it. The executors brought a bill in equity to restrain proceedings
at law. As a result of these actions he was enjoined from proceeding at
law and the agreement was ordered to be delivered up to be cancelled. It
was said that the agreement was one the influence of which would be "to
accelerate the death on which the surgeon is to have Y25,000," and to be
intrinsically of such a character as to be "totally void in point of law."
The court being satisfied it was made without adequate ccnsideration, it
was held invalid on that ground. A case somewhat resembling Dent v.
Bennett is Allen v. Davis, 20 L. J. (N. S.) Eq., 44 (1850).
In conclusion it may be said that whether an ambiguous instrument
is testamentary or a promise binding the estate of the maker is a matter
of intention rather than form, except as to the execution of the instrument;
that delivery of the instrument or retaining control over it with power of
revocation is of importance in determining the intention of the maker. If
the instrument in form is a promise to pay, did the maker intend to create
the relation of debtor and creditor. If so, was the promise for sufficient
consideration and was the act completed by delivery.
